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In the Shadow of the Australia – China Free Trade Agreement Negotiation: 
Obstacles and Suggestions 
Ling Ling He 
 
Since the 1990s, regional trade agreements have come to complement multilateral 
trade agreements as a major means for promoting free trade. With free trade 
agreements spreading across Europe, the Americas and East Asia, China and 
Australia entered into negotiations for an Australia – China free trade agreement 
(ACFTA) in 2005. So far, fourteen rounds of talks have been held. However, 
negotiations between the two countries seem to have come to a standstill with no 
substantial progress has been made since December 2008. 
 
This article seeks to explain why the negotiations of the ACFTA have been extremely 
difficult. It points out that while Canberra wants to gain more market access in China 
for Australian firms, particularly access to agricultural and foreign direct investments 
sectors, Beijing is more interested in seeking a stable supply of energy resources and 
raw materials that China needs for her rapidly growing economy. The sticking point 
has been the differing approaches of the two countries by reason of their differences 
in level of economic development, understanding of FTA, the logistics of market and 
non market economies, different political systems, cultural outlook, and the issue 
human rights. There has also been stubborn resistance in some quarters to a FTA in 
both countries: in China, against further liberalisation of the agricultural and services 
sectors beyond the level of her World Trade Organisation (WTO) commitments; in 
Australia against the potential influx of cheap Chinese goods as well as the risk of 
losing control of its Resources industry. Additional Australian concerns include China‘s 
poor record on environmental and food safety standards. As a means of overcoming 
these hurdles, the paper suggests the need for a period of adjustment of the 
respective markets in the sensitive areas of agriculture, and the services and 
investment markets. This will condition the constituencies in both countries of the 
benefits of ACTFA. In this respect, the existing China – New Zealand FTA provisions 
Special Agricultural Safeguard Measures (Art 13) and Trade in Services (Arts 103-
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124) provide a useful referent. The paper suggests avenues for breaking the 
deadlock, and that these lie in terms of institutional changes, and a stronger 
commitment from the leadership of both economies. 
 
I. Drivers of the ACFTA negotiation process 
 
Bilateral trade between China and Australia has been growing continuously since the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1972.1 The 1973 
Trade Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China has served as the basis for the bilateral trade and 
economic relationship.2 This has been enhanced by the conclusion of further 
bilateral agreements, such as the 1988 Agreement on the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investments,3 and also by the active commitment 
of both Australia and China to the promotion of regional economic development 
through cooperation in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping. 
With China‘s accession to the WTO in December 2001 providing a more stable 
institutional framework for the bilateral trade, the two countries‘ commitment to a 
strong multilateral trading system and to their respective rights and obligations under 
the WTO, has represented a further enhancement in the institutional basis for the 
commercial relationship. Against this institutional background, the trade and 
investment relationship has witnessed impressive growth. By the end of 2008, China 
is already Australia‘s largest trading partner and is Australia‘s largest export market. 
Australia is also an important trading and investment partner for China. In this sense, 
one wonders why Australia and China are keen to enter into a free trade agreement 
when they have achieved so much under the WTO memberships. 
 
  
A FTA is a reciprocal arrangement whereby trade barriers between participating 
nations are reduced or eliminated. Under the current WTO regime, FTA is subject to 
three sets of rules. The first is Article XXIV of GATT 1947 which, as clarified in the 
                                                 
1
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2
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Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, provides for 
the formation and operation of customs unions and FTA on trade in goods. Secondly 
is the so-called ―Enabling Clause‖, permitting preferential trade arrangements in 
trade in goods between developing country Members. The ―Enabling Clause‖ was 
officially called the ―Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries‖, which was adopted 
under GATT in 1979 and enables developed members to give differential and more 
favourable treatment to developing countries, e.g. preferential tariff treatment. Thirdly 
is GATS Article V - Economic Integration - governs the formation of FTA in the area 
of trade in services. The unique nature of FTA is that it allows each member to 
determine its own external trade barrier against non-FTA members independently, 
including WTO members. In this sense, FTA seems at odds with the Most-Favoured-
Nation (MFN) clause of WTO. The draftsmen of the GATT and WTO were well 
aware of this and therefore, created several conditional exceptions for FTA as three 
rules discussed above. The unique result of such accommodation of FTAs by the 
WTO agreements is that it enables members of FTAs to set their own tariff barriers 
alongside, and independent of any WTO tariff schedules the FTA members may be 
bound by in their capacity as WTO members.  
 
Although the elimination of substantially all trade impediments between FTA 
members are reduced over time and in most case, not all trade is completely free of 
national barriers, the unique nature of FTA that entitles its member countries more 
benefits comparing the WTO members promotes the proliferation of it all around the 
world. Some 462 regional trade agreements have been notified to the GATT/WTO 
up to February 2010, of which FTA and partial scope agreements account for 90%.4 
Apart from these special FTA benefits the FTA members are entitled beyond the 
WTO regime; there are also some domestic concerns from both China and Australia 
that promote the initiation of the ACFTA, as discussed in the paragraphs below. 
 
(I) China‘s concerns 
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China‘s motivations in negotiating the ACFTA could be examined under two different 
categories. Internationally, the increasing prevalence of regional free trade 
agreements has been showing that developed countries are seeking to build 
economic spheres of influence in which they can play a dominant role. This in 
practice has served to boost the diversification of markets. In corresponding to this, 
China decided to formulate a strategic framework for market diversification with 
expanding of free trade agreements. More importantly, the economic uncertainties 
caused by the 2007 sub-prime mortgage crisis5 and ever-increasing trade barriers 
that have emerged in the EU and the US have made Australia an attractive trading 
partner for China. Trade frictions between China and the United States and Europe 
have been escalating, causing serious damage to China's exports. All this has 
prompted China to seek new trading partners in order to diversify the external risks 
involved in the process of its domestic restructuring. Domestically, China is 
interested in seeking a stable supply of energy resources, such as uranium and iron 
ore, and raw materials that China need for domestic economic development. 
Minerals have long been the main commodity that Australia exports to China. In 
2006, Australia exported US $8.25 billion of minerals to China, accounting for 53.6% 
of its total exports to China, representing an increase of 34.4% over the previous 
year.6 In the same year, Australian exports of nickel, lead, zinc and copper to China 
increased by 159.0%, 122.2%, 73.1% and 70.0% respectively on a year-on-year 
basis.7 Apparently, Australia is becoming increasingly prominent in China's strategy 
to acquire raw materials. China thus hopes to include a clause in the ACFTA to lock 
in supply from Australia at relatively stable prices, which had become a priority in 
China‘s foreign economic policy objectives, as well as a crucial part of national 
security – energy security.8 The other key economic concern of China is to seek for 
market economy status from Australia and subsequently to use this to request the 
EU and the US to follow this suit, which would critically ease her disadvantaged 
                                                 
5
  The subprime mortgage crisis is an ongoing real estate crisis and financial crisis triggered by a 
dramatic rise in mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures in the United States, with major adverse 
consequences for banks and financial markets around the global.   
6
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7
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position as a transitional economy for 15 years after the WTO admission9 in 
antidumping and countervailing cases.  
(II) Australia‘s concerns 
With China‘s increasing economic growth power, Australia is more interested in 
China‘s potential market. Compared with China‘s seeking in energy resources and 
raw materials, Australia wants to gain more market access for its agricultural and 
manufacturing exports. For example, Australian exports of simply transformed 
manufactures (STMs) and elaborately transformed manufactures (ETMs) like 
electrical machinery and telecommunications equipment have grown steadily; driving 
growth in Australia‘s total manufacturing exports. Strong Chinese economic growth 
underpins demand for STMs as key industrial inputs into the production process. 
Trade in ETMs has also been driven by the increasing importance of intra-industry 
trade; the growing sophistication of China‘s economy, which is creating new 
opportunities for niche products and services; and the expanding purchasing power 
of China‘s consumers. More importantly, Canberra takes the access to direct 
investments in China as a bigger priority for Australia as it negotiates a FTA, says 
Australia‘s Trade Minister Simon Crean.10  
 
II. Issues and Obstacles in establishing the ACFTA 
 
Australia and China share a strong and rapidly growing trade and economic 
relationship. Further strengthening and deepening this relationship is a major priority 
for both countries, with both governments committed to sustaining the impressive 
trade and investment performance achieved in the past two decades. China 
accepted Australia‘s proposal of the ACFTA following Chinese President Hu Jintao‘s 
visit to Australia in October 2003. A trade and economic framework agreement for 
the potential ACFTA was signed, and negotiation talks began in April 2005 after a 
feasibility study was conducted. So far, fourteen rounds of talks have been held but 
                                                 
9
 Protocol on the Accession of the People‘s Republic of China, Section 15 (d). 
10
 Khaleej Times, 30/10/2009. China Wants Urgency in Australia Free Trade Talks, 
http://www.menafn.com/qn_news_story_s.asp?StoryId=1093279990 (accessed 19 Mar 2010) 
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no visible results have emerged. The paragraphs below discuss why the ACFTA 
negotiations have been approved so difficult. 
 
(I) GATS 
Trade in service is a crucial part in negotiating the ACFTA. Both Australia and China 
want to gain more market access to each other‘s service industries, especially the 
former. However, the structure of the GATS implies that trade negotiations in the 
services area were sectoral, and can be expected to be driven very much by the 
concerns and interests of the players in each industry.11 Thus, although basic WTO 
principles, such as removing trade restrictions and non-discriminatory barriers, to 
market access were agreed to be legitimate objects of the ACFTA negotiation, this is 
on a sector-by-sector basis. Given that a sectoral approach has been chosen, the 
needs of service providers could be factored into specific commitments in any 
sectors, e.g. access to capital information, telecoms networks, or accompanying 
labour mobility. However, the GATS itself does not mandate any particular 
suggestion as to what sector has to be included in the negotiation.12 This largely 
impedes the ACFTA negotiation. For example, China would like to include the 
market access in medical profession in the ACFTA while Australia would not want to 
open up the profession to Chinese trained doctors out of the profession‘s own self 
interest.  
 
(II) TRIPS 
 
Intellectual property right is one of the sensitive issues in the ACFTA negotiation, 
which blocks the negotiation progress. Similar to the problems emerged when China 
joined the WTO; Australia‘s concern is about China‘s poor IPR protection and 
enforcement. Given the somewhat abstract nature of IPR, the protection of IPR is not 
normally a top priority in a country‘s development strategy, not less in such a country 
like China which has been described as being large, complex, diverse and 
―sometimes internally contradictory‖13 with economic conditions varying drastically as 
                                                 
11
 John H. Jackson, William J. Davey & Alan O. Sykes, Jr., Legal Problems of International Economic 
Relations: Cases, Materials and Text (American: West Group, 5
th
 ed, 2008), p. 946. 
12
 Ibid, p947. 
13
 CF Bergsten, B Gill NR Lardy and D Mitchell (eds), China: The Balance Sheet: What the World 
Needs to Know Now About the Emerging Superpower (2006) Public Affairs. 
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between the different parts of the country. Even in the United States, the protection 
of IPR is generally considered to be of lower priority than the resolution of such 
domestic problems as the prevention of murders, burglaries, robberies, thefts, 
arsons, assaults and distribution of narcotics and Child pornography.14 Moreover, the 
abstract nature of IPR alongside its importance to economic development makes 
IPR policing unattractive for the host country. In the face of this, overcoming the 
conflicts and challenges towards a more developed IPR regime, would involve 
incurring short-run costs, such as unemployment as labour shifts from infringing 
activities, as well as higher prices for consumer goods which might discourage 
economic development. To some extent, the lack of awareness of the close 
relationship between the protection of IPR and economic development has also 
postponed the progress for upgrading of IPR protection in China. Thus, it is not hard 
to understand the present neglect of intellectual property rights protection in 
countries all over the world. 
 
Moreover, TRIPS itself does not ―create any obligation with respect to the distribution 
of resources as between the enforcement of intellectual property rights and the 
enforcement of law in general.‖15 That is to say, a WTO member state is not required 
to devote more resources to intellectual property enforcement than other areas of 
law enforcement. With this background China appears to have fulfilled its 
enforcement obligations as required by TRIPS Art 41(5).16 This is made clearer in 
the consultation process on the dispute filed by the US against China with the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body on ―Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights”.17 Instead of general enforcement measures charges, 
the focus of this dispute was on the lack of compliance with specific provisions of the 
TRIPS, that is, the lack of criminal procedures and penalties for commercial scale 
counterfeiting and piracy in China. The US claimed that China had failed to make the 
procedures and penalties required by the first and second sentences of TRIPS Art 
                                                 
14
  Peter K., Yu, ‗Three Questions That Will Make You Rethink the U.S.-China Intellectual Property 
Debate‘ (2008) 7 John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 416. 
15
 TRIPS Article 41 (5). 
16
 ―It is understood that this Part does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial system for the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general, 
nor does it affect the capacity of Members to enforce their law in general.  Nothing in this Part 
creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of 
intellectual property rights and the enforcement of law in general.‖ 
17
  WTO Doc WT/DS362.  
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61 ―available‖ as required by TRIPS Art 41 (1).18 However, the WTO Panel Report 
exercised judicial economy with respect to the claims under TRIPS Art 41 (1) and the 
second sentence of Art 61, and finally concluded that the United States has not 
established that the criminal thresholds of Copyright Law of the PRC are inconsistent 
with China‘s obligation under the first sentence of TRIPS Art 61.19  
 
(III) Different background and negotiation approaches 
 
The two countries have different approaches to FTA negotiation resulting from their 
differences in the level of economic development, their understanding of FTA and of 
the logistics of the market economy, and political system. For example, Australia and 
China have two very different political systems. The former encourages robust 
debate in public, while the latter places greater priority of public unity and consensus. 
This no doubt presents great challenges to manage matters when interests, values, 
and concerns are pulled in opposing directions in the two countries. As to the 
negotiation approach, while Australia wishes the application of GATT Art XXIV 
(Regional Agreement) to cover ―substantially all trade‖ in the FTA, China prefers use 
of the ―enabling clause‖20 to negotiate trade in goods first, and services and 
investment later, so as to gain more time for her domestic economy to confront the 
challenges that the FTA with Australia would bring to China. Moreover, there are 
also diplomatic tensions extending the impasse of the ACFTA negotiation. For 
example, the tension sparked by the arrest of Rio Tinto executive Stern Hu, a 
Chinese born Australian citizen in Shanghai some weeks after Rio had rejected a 
huge cash infusion from China's Chinalco.21 Other Chinese attempts to buy into 
Australia's huge resources sector have also hit trouble following China‘s discontent 
over Australia's move to allow a visit by exiled Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer, as well 
as controversies about Australia‘s new Defence White Paper.22 
                                                 
18
 WTO Doc WT/DS362/R, 2. 
19
 WTO Doc WT/DS 362/R, 133. 
20
 See above, Part I. 
21
 China Wants New Ties with Australia, SBS, 2009. Available at: 
http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/1121747/China-wants-new-ties-with-Australia 
(accessed 20 April 2010) 
22
 Australia Moves to Quell Tension with China, ABC News, 2009. Available at:  
http://www.abc.net.au/ra/asiapac/stories/200910/s2724780.htm (accessed at 20 April 
2010). 
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(IV) Resistance from China‘s domestic constituencies 
 
Chinese central policymakers do not enjoy as much policy making autonomy as they 
used to, and now often face quite stubborn resistance from protectionist interest 
groups against the opening up of markets. The increased assertion of domestic 
interests comes from experience as well as resentment that has followed from 
China‘s accession to the WTO and its impact on some sectors, as well as from 
partial reforms that has produced monopoly profits for some other sectors. Their 
influence is further strengthened by the sensitivity of political and social problems in 
China, e.g. Tibet, human rights, and rural problems. Given this context, domestic 
resistance in China to further liberalising trade and investment to China beyond the 
level of WTO commitments has come mostly from the agricultural, services, and 
Investment sectors.  
a) Agriculture 
Agriculture has been the most sensitive sector in the ACFTA negotiation. Agriculture 
is a special sector for every country because of political concerns. This is especially 
true in China. It is also one of the ―three agricultural‖ problems facing the country: 
peasant, rural area, and agriculture, and been on the highest list of policy priorities at 
the 16th National People's Congress in 2004, and remains so today.23 One of the 
fiercest opponents to the prospective opening of Chinese agriculture to Australia has 
been the Ministry of Agriculture of China (MOA), which plays the role of representing 
farming interests in China. The MOA has repeatedly asserted that Chinese trade 
negotiators had already made far too many concessions under the WTO.24 For 
instance, the MOA claims that wool production in China has been almost completely 
lost because of foreign competition following the WTO accession.  
Ethnic issues have become more sensitive in recent years in China's domestic 
politics following an increasing incidence of violent conflicts between the Han 
majority and Muslims.25 The need to protect the interests and livelihood of ethnic 
                                                 
23
 ―Central Government‘s View on Policies to Increase Peasants‘ Income‖ [Zhongyang guangyu  
zengjia nongmin shouru ruogan zhengce de yujian], People‘s Daily of China, 9 Febuary 2004. 
24
 Protocol on the Accession of People‘s Republic of China, Part I, Section 12. 
25
 See, ―Ethnic Conflict Catches China Off Guard‖, Asian Economic News, 8 Nov. 2004, available 
online at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDP/is_2004_Nov_8/ai_n6343590. Mathew D. 
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minority groups within China has also generated considerable resistance to the 
opening up of markets under a FTA. The provinces in North China26 which are home 
to many ethnic minorities reside including Muslims and Mongolians most of whom 
rely on cattle and sheep farming for a living, are those which will be most likely 
affected by the ACTFA. Once the Chinese government opens the wool trade market 
to Australia, there would be adverse impacts on Chinese fine wool growers. This 
need to ―protect the ethnic minorities' economy and maintain the border stability‖27 of 
China assumes great significance in respect of an FTA. Moreover, as compared with 
China's FTA with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the potential 
agricultural trade volume between China and Australia will be much bigger, and the 
area that would be affected by the potential ACFTA was much wider. It is thus not 
difficult to understand why the Chinese have been ―at pains to say that they were on 
the defensive on agriculture and would resist liberalisation there‖28 as from the very 
first rounds of negotiations in respect of ACTFA. 
b) Services and investment   
Services trade and market access for foreign investments are closely related, and 
have been another of the most contentious areas in the FTA negotiations between 
China and Australia. Although Australian services industries have been keen to enter 
the Chinese market, Chinese domestic service providers and relevant government 
institutions have been clearly resistant to significant liberalisation services and 
investment beyond the WTO commitments.29 The Chinese government believes it 
has already made substantial concessions under the WTO and carried them out 
faithfully. Chinese services regulators argue that the WTO impacts on domestic 
industries still need to be seen, before it can commit to any further liberalisation or 
                                                                                                                                                        
Moneyhon, 2004, ―Taming China's ―Wild West‖: Ethnic Conflict in Xinjiang', Peace,Conflict, and 
Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal 5, 5: 2-23. Jessica Koch, 2006, ―Economic Development 
and Ethnic Separatism in Western China: A New Model of Peripheral Nationalism‖, Murdoch 
University Asia Research Centre Working Paper No. 134 (Aug. 2006), available online at 
http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/wp/WP134.pdf. 
26
 Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia and inner Mongolia.  
27
 Tian, Kechuan (2006) Fine wool industry in China and the free trade between China and Australia. 
Australia-China FTA Agricultural Conference Xi'an — in, Australian DFAT. 
28
 Kohler Alan. ‗FTAs Protectionism in Disguise: Garnant― (2005) Inside Business, ABC Australia, 24, 
April. 
29
 Protocol on the Accession of People‘s Republic of China, Part II.  
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experimentation.30 For instance, regulators of China‘s banking sector believe that 
Chinese banks are still vulnerable to foreign competition. Australian negotiators have 
tried to persuade China that medium-sized Australian companies can enhance the 
competitiveness of Chinese companies without their facing the destructive force of 
big European and American companies. This is consistent with the rhetoric of some 
Chinese trade officials about the role of ACFTA. However, China is still very cautious 
on such experiments. According to the Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM) 
officials, imposing domestic reforms is not the starting point or motivation of the 
Chinese government in its pursuit of FTAs. Unlike the motivations which had 
prompted China to join the WTO which included the desire to use the move to WTO 
membership as the lever to push forward domestic reforms, Beijing is now assuming 
a more cautious approach to domestic reform under a FTA for reasons of economic 
security and stability, which factors now have assumed priority in China's current 
reform and opening up strategy. 
c) Policymaking institutions 
Unlike in respect of the WTO accession, there is yet to emerge a ―Central Leading 
Group‖ made of a Premier and ministerial representatives to coordinate policymaking 
in relation to The China-Australia FTA negotiations.31 Several domestic policymaking 
bodies have also constrained Chinese negotiators‘ room for concession. While 
MOFCOM is designated as the lead agency to negotiate the ACFTA, it does not 
have the formal authority to settle conflicting domestic interests. Nor is the MOFCOM 
expected to report directly to the leadership or the State Council on what are 
regarded as ―working issues‖. While the MOFCOM has the same political rank as 
other industrial ministries, it is of lesser standing than some national commissions, 
and is consequently subject to pressure from other ministries and commissions to 
accommodate their interests. Moreover, because the power of trade, investment and 
industrial policymaking is fragmented among MOFCOM, the National Development 
and Reforms Commission (NDRC), and other ministerial-level government agencies, 
MOFCOM cannot propel trade liberalization without the consent of others. All of 
these force MOFCOM to take a conservative position at the ACFTA negotiation.  
                                                 
30
 Australia DFAT, ―Updates on Progress in the Negotiations‖, available online at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/; see in particular the 8
th
 and 9
th
 rounds of negotiations. 
31
 Jiang, abovw n 8, at 191. 
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Domestic resistance to the FTA has also come from the NDRC, a powerful institution 
with oversight of China‘s industry policies. It seems to not only have inherited a 
conservative position on reforms and opening from its former body, the State 
Planning Agency, but also enjoys increased power because part of the State 
Economic and Trade Commission was merged into the Agency to form NDRC. Other 
government agencies call the NDRC a ―small state council‖,32 because it has 
departments matching every sector of the economy, and holds a higher political 
position than the ministries. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
remains concerned that NDRC has not been fully involved in the negotiations and 
therefore MOFCOM cannot move beyond traditional agendas.33 
(V) Resistance from Australia‘s domestic constituencies 
Australia‘s domestic resistance is mainly from its businesses. Due to the competitive 
―made-in-China‖ products, Australian manufacturers are worried about the potential 
influx of cheap Chinese goods could take a critical part of their market shares. Local 
horticulturalists and others are also concerned about low wages and poor 
environmental and food safety standards behind China‘s agricultural exports to 
Australia. More importantly, with China‘s great interests in Australia‘s mining and 
energy resources, there is increasing worries about the risk of losing control of 
Australia‘s resources industry to China. Additionally, Australia has an IP chapter in 
all of its FTA, with the exception of that with New Zealand.34 In part of a 
consequence of the Australia-US FTA, Australia IP rules are currently among the 
most stringent in the world. This makes it difficult for Australia to comprehend 
Chinese attitudes to IPR protection. IP protection has become an issue in China‘s 
thought agenda only since the 1980s.35 Consequently, Australian enterprises 
exporting and investing into China consider the lack of effective IPR protection as 
being of the greatest concern. Almost half of the firms exporting to China identified 
shortcomings in IPR protection as the issue of most concern amongst all non-tariff 
barriers to trade in China. In addition, a lack of transparency in legal and financial 
                                                 
32
 Ibid, at 192. 
33
 Ibid. 
34 Ogge-Cowan, Jane. "Chapter 16 - The Australia-China Trade Agreement: implications for 
intellectual property law" (2008) in Brian Fitzgerald, Fuping Gao, Damien O'Brien, Sampsung 
Xiaoxiang Shi (eds), Copyright Law, Digital Content and the Internet in the Asia-Pacific (2008) 339. 
35
 Peter K. Yu, ‗Still Dissatisfied after All These Years: Intellectual Property, Post-WTO China, and the 
Avoidable Cycle of Futility‘ (2005) 34 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 149. 
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systems is also considered as an important barrier as well as the inconsistent 
interpretations of Chinese law.  
III. On overcoming the Impediments 
Some of the issues discussed above have emerged in the existing FTAs which 
Australia and China have entered into separately. Although they existed differently 
because of the different backgrounds of the negotiating countries, they have all been 
solved in reaching a final FTA. Therefore, it is of great benefit to look back at the 
negotiations of the existing FTAs and find some referent which might be useful for a 
breakthrough for the ACFTA. For example, in the China – New Zealand FTA, China 
is permitted to apply a special safeguard measure to agriculture goods if the volume 
of imports from New Zealand of an originating good listed in Table one of Annex 2 
exceeds the trigger level for that product in that calendar year.36 However, this 
special safeguard measure must be implemented in the form of an additional 
customs duty, and in a transparent manner.37 The same words ―transparent 
manner‖38 was used in Australia-US FTA, which also established a Committee on 
Agriculture to provide a forum for agricultural matters arising between the two 
countries.39 The ―special safeguard measure‖ and ―agricultural Committee‖ are great 
referents to be included in the forthcoming ACFTA. It is interesting to note that the 
Australia-US FTA provides an opportunity for each party to modify market access 
commitments for dairy goods listed in each party‘s Schedule after 20 years of the 
Agreement.40 This could be used as an important strategy to deal with the sensitive 
agriculture sector in the ACFTA. China in this sense can open her agriculture market 
to Australia gradually but observe the right to modify the market access 
commitments after a specific period within the applicable legal procedures. The 
existing Australia-US FTA and China-New Zealand FTA also provide some direction 
for the ACFTA to deal with trade in services. For example, both of them embody a 
―Specific Commitments‖ provision41  to deal with the specific issues, and moreover, 
Art 108 of the latter lists the measures a Party shall not maintain or adopt to restrain 
                                                 
36
 China-New Zealand FTA, Art 13 (2). 
37
 Ibid, Art 13 (6).  
38
 Australia-US FTA, Art 3.4 (5). 
39
 Ibid, Art 3.2. 
40
 Ibid, Art 3.6. 
41
 Australia-US FTA Art 10.12, and China-New Zealand FTA Art 109. 
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the other Party‘s market access, e.g. limitation on the number of service suppliers, 
the total value of service transactions, or the total number of service operations.42 
China-Australia FTA negotiations should be promoted from a strategic perspective 
and give full play to each other's strengths. The need for mutual benefit in China-
Australia ties should be stressed. Firstly, both sides need to pay particular attention 
to the balance of their interests during the negotiations, taking into account not only 
their own capacity, but also the legitimate requirements of the other party. On the 
one hand, sufficient allowance needs to be given in terms of the scope and timetable 
of tariff concessions for those sectors in which one party is lagging. On the other 
hand, both sides need guaranteed gains to make the process worthwhile. Second, 
the creation of the free trade area will impact heavily on the development of some 
sectors of the Chinese economy, agriculture in particular. To address such impacts 
effectively, efforts made during the negotiations to gain more space to manoeuvre 
are themselves not enough. Internal adjustment must also be implemented. In her 
negotiations with Australia concerning the agricultural sector, China must insist on a 
gradual approach in opening up the market for the agricultural products that are most 
severely affected, and demand that Australia amend its current practice of imposing 
trade barriers via Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.43 At the same 
time, China needs to speed up its agricultural adjustment, for example by increasing 
financial and technological input in areas involving such labour-intensive agricultural 
products as vegetables and fruits, and enhancing the export advantages of these 
products. 
IV. Concluding Thoughts  
 
Australia and China must approach their negotiations with a view to achieving the 
ultimate win-win outcome by bridging their differences, while recognising that 
negotiations alone cannot solve all the problems. A successful conclusion of ACFTA 
is in the interests of both Australia and China. The fundamental way of achieving an 
early resolution of ACFTA lies in balancing domestic gain with the need for domestic 
industrial and infrastructure adjustment.The hope for a change in China‘s position in 
                                                 
42
 China-New Zealand FTA Art 108 (2). 
43
 Cheng, above n 6, at 35.  
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the negotiation lies in institutional change, such as the formation of a central 
coordination agency and a stronger commitment to the negotiating front. 
 
 
 
 
